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Expensive Depravedteen Depraved Online Depraved Cs Contact Depraved A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6)

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Evidence of a rape while the victim was conscious “independently establishes both mental and physical suffering.”  Contact Depraved x Depravedteen esearchs Depraved v Online Online s Contact a Contact c Contact n Depravedteen Dssearchasearchusearcho Online +searchie Expensive r Depraved h%E Contact %F%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8+%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3+%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA+AsXsAA Depraved % Depraved 9BA Depraved 9 Expensive % Depraved 7search9 Contact %tudou+nisearch+%E8%8F%AF%E9%BA%97%E7%9A%84%E6%8C%91%E6%88%B0%E7%9C%9F%E4%BA%BA%E7%89%88%E7%AC%AC64%Esearch%8 Depravedteen % Online 1searchEsearch%search8searchB Online %search7%searchCsearch9search% Online 4searchB Contact %Adresse+Kunstforum+InternationalA Depraved E7 Depravedteen 8%8 Depraved % Depravedteen 7%ACtudou+nisearch+%E8%8F%AF%E9%BA%97%E7%9A%84%E6%8C%91%E6%88%B0%E7%9C%9F%E4%BA%BA%E7%89%88%E7%AC%AC6ACsearchc Online a Depraved Dsearchpsearchaesearch Depraved s Online a Depraved c%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8+%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3+%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA+AsXsA , 206 Ariz. at 236, 77 P.3d at 34.

Setting Someone on Fire (while alive):  Satisfies cruelty element, as the victim suffers both mental and physical suffering. State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 859 P.2d 156, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026 (1993) (victim was conscious during burning and survived for a few hours before dying). Note that other cases support applying depravity to burning death.

No Vicarious Liability:  A defendant cannot be “vicariously liable” for cruelty in a capital case, absent a “plan intended or reasonably certain to cause suffering.”  State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 583, 48 P.3d 1180, 1193 (2002).  The plan must be “such that suffering before death must be inherently and reasonably certain to occur, not just an untoward event.”  Id.  However, where the defendant actually participated in the killing, the fact that he did not actually perform the murder does not preclude application of the “cruelty” subpart of (F)(6).  See State v. Frank Anderson, 210 Ariz. at __, ¶109-14, 111 P.3d at 395 (where defendant held down first victim while co- conspirator administered fatal wound and both hit third victim and gave co-conspirator weapon with which to kill third victim, cruelty aspect of (F)(6) could lawfully be applied to defendant).

"Especially Heinous or Depraved" (The defendant-oriented factors)

The term “heinous or depraved” is used to describe the defendant’s state of mind.  Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19,31,97 P.3d 844, 856 (2004); State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 39, 612 P.2d 491, 495 (1980); Clark, 126 Ariz. at 436, 616 P.2d at 896.   The Court's interpretation of "especially heinous or depraved" was restated in Gretzler.  The Court looks to the defendant's words and actions at or near the time of the offense, to determine the defendant's state of mind.  State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 451, 702 P.2d 670 (1985).

The Six Gretzler/Ross Factors:  The Court initially delineated five factors to be considered in determining whether the defendant's state of mind was "especially heinous or depraved": (1) whether the defendant apparently relished the murder; (2) whether the defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim; (3) whether the defendant needlessly mutilated the victim; (4) the senselessness of the crime; and (5) the helplessness of the victim. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52.  In State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 886 P.2d 1354 (1994), the Court added a sixth factor by recognizing that witness elimination as a motive for murder would support finding that a murder was heinous or depraved.  The Court, however, established strict evidentiary requirements for finding witness elimination as a motive.

1.  Relishing

A defendant relishes the murder when he or she takes pride in, or derives enjoyment from the killing as demonstrated by the defendant's words or actions.  State v. Detrich, 188 Ariz. 57, 932 P.2d 1328 (1997) (defendant asked codefendant, "It's dead, but it's warm. Do you want a shot at it?").  Bragging may constitute apparent relishing of the murder.  State v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 882 P.2d 933 (1994) (defendant bragged to another inmate about "how great it was"); State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 830 P.2d 797 (1992) (defendant bragged to friends about the killing, gave bullets to a person as a souvenir, and complained that the bullets should have made a larger hole).  The Court held in State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 910 P.2d 635 (1996), that the defendant must "say or do something, other than commission of the crime itself, to show he savored the murder."  Id. at 500; accord Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. at 31-32, 97 P.3d at 856-57.  A finding of relishing only exists when the defendant affirmatively spoke or acted beyond the commission of the crime, and savored, took pride in or derived enjoyment from the murder.  See Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. at 31-32, 97 P.3d at 856-57 (where there was no evidence that the defendant did or said anything, beyond the commission of the crime itself, which manifested that he “savored the murder,” this Gretzler factor could not be found).

2.  Gratuitous Violence

The gratuitous violence factor focuses on the intent of the killer as evidenced by his actions. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 189 P.3d 403 (2008). The fact finder must consider the killer’s intentional actions to determine whether he acted with the necessary vile state of mind. The state must make two showings. The state must first show that the defendant did, in fact, use violence beyond that necessary to kill. The state must also show that the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred. Id.

The showing of using violence beyond that necessary to kill often involves a “barrage of violence.”  State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 417, 565 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1977). See Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶ 86, 189 P.3d at 421 (twenty-four knife injuries to head and face, including eight stab wounds that penetrated deep into face and neck, unnecessary to cause death); State v. Detrich, 188 Ariz. 57, 932 P.2d 1328 (1997) (three stab wounds were fatal and thirty-seven others were excessive, constituting gratuitous violence); State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 906 P.2d 579 (1995) (the victim was brutally beaten with knives and scissors, and a wooden salad fork was left protruding from the body; victim was stabbed thirty-four times; victim died of asphyxiation due to strangling); State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 412, 844 P.2d 566, 579 (1992) (finding gratuitous violence when a fragile, partially blind 83-year-old woman was beaten and strangled so severely that she suffered a broken nose and crushed Adam’s apple); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 36-37, 734 P.2d 563, 578-79 (1987) (finding gratuitous violence when a bound and gagged man was stabbed twenty-four times).

The showing that the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred provides essential evidence of the defendant’s intent to inflict gratuitous violence. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶ 87, 189 P.3d at 421 (no showing that the defendant knew or should have known victim was dead yet continued to stab her when medical examiner expressed uncertainty of timing of fatal wound in sequence of twenty-four knife injuries inflicted in less than one minute). See also, State v. Detrich, 188 Ariz. 57, 932 P.2d 1328 (1997)(three stab wounds were fatal and thirty-seven others were excessive, constituting gratuitous violence); State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 619, 944 P.2d 1222, 1233 (1997) (finding gratuitous violence when, after inflicting a wound to the head that was “unquestionably fatal,” the defendant walked around the counter and shot the victim two more times); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 488-89, 917 P.2d 200, 217-18 (1996)(finding gratuitous violence when the defendant, after inflicting two fatal blows, asphyxiated the victim); State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 886 P.2d 1329 (1994)(no showing that the defendant knew or should have known the victim was dead after the first pass of the car).

When the majority of injuries are due to the means of death without additional abuse or injury, gratuitous violence may not be established. State v. Wallace, 219 Ariz. 1, 191 P.3d 164 (2008) (four or five blows to the head with a pipe wrench over a relatively brief period); State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315 (1997) (injuries to the victim's head and neck were connected with strangulation, one blow that chips a tooth and lacerates the tongue does not constitute gratuitous violence); State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 928 P.2d 610 (1996) (gratuitous violence as an alternative to cruelty, depending on the order of infliction of wounds, does not meet the standard of proof─beyond a reasonable doubt─and the finding was reversed); State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 865 P.2d 765 (1993) (using hypervelocity bullets alone does not constitute gratuitous violence).

Necrophilia: an act of necrophilia “without question” constitutes the infliction of gratuitous violent on the victim.  State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 15, 870 P.2d 1097, 1111 (1994).

Setting Victim on Fire (while alive):  In State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 532 P.3d 704 (1977) the court upheld a depravity finding where defendant set his infant children alight.  While the opinion did not discuss Gretzler factors because Gretzler had yet to be decided, the court stated, “we can hardly think of a more ghastly death than this for anyone.  Be believe it falls squarely within the meaning of ‘heinous, cruel or depraved.’” See also State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 768 P.2d 1177 (1989) (defendant set fellow inmate alight; court upheld cruelty, depravity and heinousness on these facts; also found relishing)

3.  Needless Mutilation (a depravity indicator)

Needless mutilation occurs when the defendant mutilates the victim's body subsequent to death, reflecting "a mental state that is `marked by debasement.'"  State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 515, 633 P.2d 315, 324 (1981) (carving the word "Bonzai" into the victim's back after death); accord State v. Pandeli (II), 204 Ariz. 569, 572, 65 P.3d 950, 953 (2003).  A separate purpose to mutilate the victim's corpse must be present.  State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 580, 886 P.2d 1329 (1994).  Extensive mutilation of a body even if for the sole purpose of concealment will support a finding that the murder was “depraved.” See Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. at 32, 97 P.3d at 857 (defendant cut off finger pads, extracted teeth, and severed head and hands from the torso of the victim, and disposed of each separately) (note, Berch, J., concurring and dissenting, arguing that mutilation for concealment is not necessarily “needless”).

Occasionally, the Court has commingled gratuitous violence and needless mutilation.  State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 898 P.2d 454 (1995) (both gratuitous violence and needless mutilation existed where defendant stabbed the eyes of the victims and stomped on their bodies, knowing it would not cause death).  Gratuitous violence or needless mutilation alone would be sufficient to find the murder was heinous or depraved, thus establishing the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance.  See State v. Spencer, 176 Ariz. 36, 859 P.2d 146 (1993) (needless mutilation alone was sufficient for a finding of heinousness or depravity where defendant raped and stabbed the victim, then poured accelerant on her and set her on fire).

4.  Senselessness

A murder is senseless when it is unnecessary for the defendant to achieve his or her criminal goal.  Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315 (1997); State v. Chad Lee (Drury murder), 189 Ariz. 608, 944 P.2d 1222 (1997).  Killing any child, even a stranger, satisfies this factor. See State v. Jones, 205 Ariz. 445, 450, 72 P.3d 1264, 1269 (2003) (defendant kidnapped 12-year-old girl from park, raped her and killed her; senselessness and h/d upheld); and see Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 898 P.2d 454 (1995).  The court can look to the defendant’s stated objective in assessing the applicability of this factor.  See Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. at __, ¶65, 97 P.3d at 857 (where defendant’s stated purpose was to teach victim a “lesson” by breaking his jaw, and this could have been accomplished with one blow to the head, it was senseless to ultimately murder the victim). yExpensive Depravedteen Depraved Online Depraved Cs Contact Depraved A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) j n Depraved wExpensive Depravedteen Depraved Online Depraved Cs Contact Depraved A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) l n k k Depraved v v Hentai Mangas